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NO. 28 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law 
New Substance in the Conflict of Systems with China 
Moritz Rudolf 
In its first “Plan on Building the Rule of Law in China (2020–2025)”, the leadership in 
Beijing has set out its vision for a coherent and genuinely Chinese legal system. The 
focus here is on the term “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics”. It should 
“basically take shape” by 2035. Marxist-Leninist legal concepts remain fundamental. 
The aim is to use the law as a political instrument to make the state more efficient 
and to reduce the arbitrariness of how the law is applied for the majority of the popu-
lation, among other things, with the help of advanced technology. In some areas, for 
example on procedural issues, Beijing continues to draw inspiration from the West in 
establishing its Chinese “rule of law”. However, the party-state leadership rejects an 
independent judiciary and the principle of separation of powers as “erroneous west-
ern thought”. Beijing is explicitly interested in propagating China’s conception of law 
and legal practice internationally, establishing new legal standards and enforcing its 
interests through the law. Berlin and Brussels should, therefore, pay special attention 
to the Chinese leadership’s concept of the law. In-depth knowledge on this topic will 
be imperative in order to grasp the strategic implications of China’s legal policy, to 
better understand the logic of their actions and respond appropriately. 
 
At the 4th plenary session of the 13th 
National People’s Congress (NPC), the term 
“Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” 
appeared six times in the annual work 
report by Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the NPC 
Standing Committee. The Chinese leader-
ship had been promoting the term “socialist 
law with Chinese characteristics” for several 
months. That the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) has now 
adopted its own five-year plan to establish 
the rule of law in China illustrates the new 
quality of these efforts and how strategically 
embedded they have now become. The Xi 
administration has understood that law 
is an important lever in achieving greater 
international influence. This plan repre-
sents the most concrete expression of Xi 
Jinping’s vision of how the law should be 
interpreted and applied in China and in 
the international context. 
Defining the Terms 
The terms “socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics” and “Xi Jinping 
Thought on the Rule of Law” are key to 
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understanding China’s current judicial 
reforms. But they require explanation. 
The Chinese leadership always adds 
“with Chinese characteristics” to point out 
the special connection between the political 
fields and China’s circumstances, such as in 
the formulation, “Human rights with Chi-
nese characteristics”. According to Article 1 
of the Chinese Constitution, “the defining 
feature of socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics is the leadership of the CPC”. The 
term “socialist law with Chinese character-
istics” ties in with this. The CPC’s leadership 
is propagated as the most fundamental 
guarantee of the rule of law in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). According to 
Marxist legal tradition, Beijing sees law pri-
marily as an instrument of the CPC. After 
the communist revolution, the law was sub-
jected to “the People”, and only the CPC has 
the legitimacy to interpret their will. Con-
sequently, it is not appropriate to translate 
the Chinese term “Fǎzhì” (法治), which was 
officially introduced in 1997 by the then 
President Jiang Zemin, as rule of law in 
Western discourse. The CPC does not accept 
the intrinsic value of the law. The transla-
tion “rule by law” is more appropriate. The 
suffix “with Chinese characteristics” under-
lines Beijing’s intention to create its own 
Chinese legal system that also draws on 
traditional Chinese legal concepts. To what 
extent this goes beyond mere rhetoric is 
disputed. Nevertheless, the CPC’s behaviour 
derives on the one hand from China’s legal-
istic tradition, which demands the strict 
application of rules by a strong centralised 
state. On the other hand, it is not only rule 
by law that should apply. The population 
and party cadres are also expected to cul-
tivate moral and virtuous behaviour which 
resembles the teachings of Confucius. Xi 
Jinping regularly invokes key aspects of 
Confucianism when they serve the interests 
of the CPC. 
A much more concrete aspect of the 
Chinese rule of law is the inclusion of 
advanced technology. For one thing, it is 
comprehensively regulated by laws. While 
in Europe digitalisation is discussed pri-
marily in terms of its general effects on 
personal rights, in China it is mostly about 
regulating the private sector and Internet 
companies, in particular. For the CPC, the 
issue of fundamental rights, such as the 
right to informational self-determination, 
is irrelevant. In addition, the party relies 
on advanced technology in the search for 
justice, for example in digitalised court pro-
ceedings and via Internet Courts. 
“Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” 
is another term that the CPC is promoting 
in China’s discourse on the rule of law. 
There are a number of these abstract “Xi-
deologies” such as “Xi Jinping Thought on 
Diplomacy”. The most important of these is 
“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chi-
nese Characteristics for a New Era”, which 
was added to the Preamble of the PRC’s 
Constitution in 2018. This doctrine includes 
14 agenda items which outline the political 
direction of the Xi administration. In the 
five-year plan, “Xi Jinping Thought on the 
Rule of Law” is summarised as follows: 
Strengthening the CPC’s centralised and 
unified leadership, “scientific legislation”, 
strict law enforcement, fair trials, a law-
abiding population. 
Xi Jinping’s Judicial Reforms – 
More Power for the Party, Less 
Everyday Arbitrariness 
The plan to establish the rule of law in 
China is the latest chapter in a series of 
judicial reforms launched by President Xi 
in 2012. Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao created 
incentives for corruption within the PRC 
with his doctrine of the “harmonious soci-
ety”. In order to maintain social harmony, 
legal disputes were widely resolved through 
face-saving mediation. This risked encour-
aging the rise of informal justice. Bribery-
prone party cadres in the “Political and Legal 
Affairs Commissions” played a key role as 
mediators in legal findings. As a result, cor-
ruption became rampant as many tried to 
influence the mediation mechanism. 
Xi’s policy was initially shaped by meas-
ures to consolidate his power, which were 
focussed on a massive anti-corruption cam-
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paign. Judicial reform promoted mecha-
nisms to strengthen the local judiciary over 
local party cadres, for example through 
the establishment of Circuit Courts of the 
Supreme People's Court and measures to 
professionalise judges. 
In 2014, the 18th Central Committee of 
the CPC formulated its vision of building a 
“socialist rule of law with Chinese charac-
teristics” and “law-based governance”. This 
made it clear that the aims of the judicial 
reform were to strengthen the CPC over the 
state and to professionalise the running 
of the state. In 2018, the constitution was 
amended significantly. Accordingly, the re-
vised Article 1 constitutionalised party lead-
ership in China for the first time since the 
short-lived constitutions of 1975 and 1978. 
There has also been a clear trend since 
President Xi came to power: the state is 
becoming more efficient, especially when it 
comes to applying the law, and everyday 
arbitrariness is decreasing, especially at the 
local level. But this has nothing to do with 
establishing the rule of law as it is under-
stood in Western countries because the 
party remains above the state and controls 
itself. The party decides what is part of the 
state legal system and what is “sensitive”. 
Sensitive matters are defined by the CPC 
and assessed outside the law and are there-
fore not under the control of the state 
judiciary. 
Since Xi took office, the CPC’s influence 
over the state has increased. The area of 
application of rules that previously only ap-
plied within the party is increasingly being 
expanded to include matters that were for-
merly assigned to the state. This applies in 
part to environmental protection, for exam-
ple, or matters of national security. The 
share of documents that the State Council 
and the CPC adopt jointly has also increased, 
such as a number relating to the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). These documents are 
generally treated as party rules, but are in-
creasingly cited as a legal basis in the legis-
lative process. The CPC is also increasingly 
exerting its influence on the application of 
the law. In the National Security Law of 
2015, for example, the CPC’s National 
Security Commission was granted state 
authority – the first time since the Cul-
tural Revolution that a party organisation 
has been allowed to do so. Numerous state 
and party organisations were merged 
during structural reforms in 2018. In sen-
sitive areas (related to security policy), it 
was the party that benefited most from 
these reforms, at the expense of the state. 
In the past few years, however, there 
have been considerable efficiency gains in 
resolving non-sensitive legal disputes – 
those faced by the majority of the Chinese 
population. They have primarily been 
achieved with faster and more clearly 
defined processes in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings. For most Chinese people, this 
means less arbitrariness. 
Furthermore, the Chinese leadership is 
not interested in adopting the West’s core 
requirements for the rule of law. Instead, 
judicial reform is more about pragmatically 
adopting from the West what can be em-
bedded in the Chinese context of one-party 
rule. This applies above all to civil law, 
questions of jurisdiction and improving 
processes. In the past, the President of the 
Supreme People’s Court pointed out that 
Western “aberrations”, such as the sepa-
ration of powers and an independent judi-
ciary, were out of the question in the PRC. 
China’s First Five-Year Plan on 
Establishing the Rule of Law 
(2020–2025) 
The internal dimension 
On 10 January 2021, the CPC Central Com-
mittee adopted China’s first five-year plan 
on establishing the rule of law. This was 
preceded by a speech in November 2020 by 
President Xi during the first “central con-
ference on work related to overall law-
based governance”. In that speech he called 
for a coordinated approach to promoting 
“socialist law with Chinese characteristics”. 
This plan underlines the Chinese leader-
ship’s understanding of the law as a politi-
cal instrument. The document states that 
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rule through law is to help the state gain 
strength and prosperity. It states that the 
promotion of rule through law is necessary 
in order to ensure the resurgence of the 
PRC in the long term and to realise the 
so-called “Chinese Dream” of once again 
becoming a world power. To this end, the 
document contains the following guiding 
principles: 
∎ maintaining the centralised and unified 
leadership of the CPC as the most funda-
mental guarantee of the rule of law in 
China, 
∎ prioritising the interests of the people 
in establishing the rule of law, 
∎ promoting law as an integral part of 
the CPC, the Chinese state and Chinese 
society; adhering to a combination of 
rule of law and rule of virtue, 
∎ taking account of national circumstances 
in establishing the rule of law. 
The Chinese leadership also defined general 
goals in the plan. By 2025, it aims to: 
∎ further develop the institutional frame-
work for the rule of law in China, 
∎ establish a more complete socialist legal 
system with Chinese characteristics (in 
which the constitution plays a central 
role), a more solid governance system 
with clear administrative responsibilities 
defined by law and a more efficient judi-
cial system, 
∎ make progress on the formation of a 
“rule of law society” and 
∎ improve the application of internal party 
regulations. 
By 2035, it aims to: 
∎ have basically completed a state, a gov-
ernment and a society under the rule of 
law, 
∎ have basically formed a socialist rule of 
law system with Chinese characteristics, 
∎ fully guarantee the people’s right to 
equal participation and equal develop-
ment and 
∎ modernise the national governance sys-
tem and governance capabilities. 
The five-year plan sets out how the 
actions of the state and the CPC are to be 
formalised in order to reduce arbitrariness 
in the PRC and secure the rule of the CPC. 
It is the first publicly available official docu-
ment laying down the principles, contents 
and procedures of a constitutional review 
by the NPC Standing Committee. This, how-
ever, has nothing to do with the separation 
of powers, as the NPC formally controls 
itself. Nevertheless, the constitution as it 
stands has become increasingly important 
for state action. 
In addition, all people’s congresses are to 
be given more power in the legislative pro-
cess, for instance increasing the frequency 
with which their standing committees meet 
and by requiring them to consider legislation 
at every plenary session. More laws are to 
be passed and fewer administrative regula-
tions enacted. This is important because 
people’s congresses usually play a subordi-
nate role in the Chinese legislative process. 
There is to be more legislation, especially 
on information technology, for example 
by regulating the digital economy, Internet 
finance, artificial intelligence, big data, the 
“social credit system” and cloud computing. 
Above all, there is to be greater protection 
of intellectual property in China’s digital 
space. In line with Xi Jinping’s vision to 
build a “smart state under the rule of law” 
and to promote the “digitalisation, net-
workisation and intelligentisation of the 
rule of law in China”, these technologies 
are also to be used in applying the law, for 
example in virtual court proceedings or 
through the social credit system. 
Beijing also aims to use the plan to har-
monise laws at the central and local levels. 
It will lay down clear competences for state 
action. It is also the first public document 
calling for the enactment of a unified Chi-
nese Administrative Procedure Law. The 
law enforcement system is also to be made 
more efficient, mainly by clearly defining 
the different competencies among the law 
enforcement authorities. Also on the agenda 
is the improvement of criminal procedural 
law, for example with regard to the admis-
sion of evidence. There are to be standard-
ised, legally codified control mechanisms 
and rules of jurisdiction for state actors 
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(administrative and judicial bodies, super-
visory and law enforcement authorities, 
courts, public prosecutor’s office) at various 
levels (provinces, cities, counties and town-
ships). The document also promises to 
strengthen the rights of the parties to the 
proceedings, for instance through a system 
for recording accountability of interroga-
tion cases by judicial personnel. 
It also calls for the judiciary to be pro-
fessionalised. A new generation of “revo-
lutionary regularised, specialised, and 
professional” legal teams is to be formed, 
who are not only loyal to the party, the 
state, the people and the law, but also act 
virtuously. Supporting the CPC is a pre-
requisite for working in the judiciary. 
The entire Chinese population is to be 
taught the meaning of “socialist rule of law 
with Chinese characteristics” and of “Xi 
Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law”. With-
in the CPC, these issues are to play a key 
role in the party schools. But they are also 
to become an integral part of the curricula 
at schools and universities. 
Beijing is also planning to strengthen the 
party’s internal regulations and establish an 
internal party legal system. China’s rulers are 
aiming for national laws and internal party 
regulations to be complementary, mutually 
reinforcing and mutually guaranteed. 
International dimension 
One chapter of the plan is devoted to the 
outside world. It concerns the “preservation 
of national sovereignty, security and devel-
opmental interests” through the law. It con-
tains explanations of the principle of “one 
country, two systems”. A “high degree of 
autonomy” is to be guaranteed to Hong 
Kong and Macau. Interventions by “foreign 
forces” should be opposed and prevented. 
Communications and legal exchanges in 
jurisprudence and legal circles are to be 
supported with Taiwan. With the help of 
the law, steps are to be taken towards peace-
ful reunification and against aspirations of 
independence. This is fuelling speculation 
about a Taiwan-specific “anti-secession 
law”. Beijing also wants more cooperation 
on law enforcement and bilateral legal 
assistance between the mainland, Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan. This chapter also 
sets out the goal of strengthening the regu-
latory framework of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) in order to cement the absolute 
rule of the CPC over the PLA. 
Section 25 of the plan reveals the inter-
national dimensions of China’s endeavours, 
which are: 
∎ expanding Chinese international law 
expertise, 
∎ the conception of an international law 
theory on “socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics”, 
∎ active participation in the formulation 
of international rules in order to estab-
lish a “fair” and “reasonable” inter-
national legal system, 
∎ promoting the Chinese concept of the 
"rule of law" internationally, 
∎ establishing a mechanism to identify 
laws from other states with extraterri-
torial effect, 
∎ more protection for the rights of Chinese 
nationals and legal entities abroad, 
∎ promoting international legal coopera-
tion within the framework of the BRI, for 
example by creating international com-
mercial courts, 
∎ establishing new mechanisms for inter-
national arbitration, 
∎ cooperation between arbitration tribu-
nals from China and from BRI countries, 
∎ strengthening bilateral and multilateral 
dialogue on the rule of law and exchange 
programmes, especially within the frame-
work of the BRI, 
∎ promoting China’s institutional judicial 
assistance system and mechanism and 
expanding international cooperation of 
judicial assistance in the field of extra-
dition and repatriation of criminal sus-
pects and transfer of sentenced persons, 
∎ international law enforcement cooperat-
ing in the fight against violent terrorism, 
ethnic separatism, religious extremism, 
drug trafficking and transnational crime, 
∎ strengthening international cooperation 
in the fight against corruption and in 
the detection and return of stolen goods. 
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The final chapter points to the central 
role of the CPC in establishing a “rule of 
law with Chinese characteristics”. Party 
leadership is to be further anchored in law, 
and a theory about the rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics to be developed. 
This is to contain aspects of the “excellent 
traditional Chinese legal culture” without 
further details being specified. All depart-
ments of the CPC in all provinces are in-
structed to fully implement the spirit and 
requirements of the plan and create imple-
mentation plans that take into account 
local circumstances. 
Assessment 
The document summarises Beijing’s stra-
tegic efforts to establish its own Chinese 
version of the “rule of law” as a coherent 
future-proof model. Primarily, it is about 
making the state more efficient and shoring 
up the absolute dominance of the CPC. 
These aspirations could outlast Xi Jinping’s 
presidency and become a legacy of his 
policies. One example would be establish-
ing a formalised mechanism for deter-
mining leadership succession. 
Where it serves one-party rule, the docu-
ment draws on Western aspects of the rule 
of law, especially when it comes to regu-
lating civil law matters, jurisdiction and 
procedural matters. Nevertheless, the five-
year plan bears no resemblance to the 
Western understanding of the rule of law. 
Its objective is for the law to better control 
state actions, but without limiting the 
power of the party in any way. Instead, the 
law is to become a more efficient instru-
ment of rule for the party. 
China could create a mechanism that 
reduces arbitrariness for the majority of its 
population and creates a degree of legal 
certainty with the aid of advanced technol-
ogy to determine, apply and enforce the 
law. Millions of Chinese are already using 
apps (e.g. WeChat or the China Mobile 
Micro Court) to file lawsuits or submit 
motions for evidence, without corrupt party 
cadres at the local level being able to exert 
influence. Beijing is promoting the use of 
digital technology as an alternative to the 
separation of powers, since they are alleg-
edly objective and not corruptible. The 
CPC’s view is that, in an authoritarian con-
text, digital tools can produce the same 
effect as a functioning separation of pow-
ers, without questioning one-party rule. 
The political will to further develop the use 
of advanced technology in law should not 
be underestimated. Despite there still being 
significant obstacles to implementation, 
some approaches to an objective, albeit dys-
topian “Chinese” way of determining the 
law already exist. These include the social 
credit system. It allows people’s behaviour 
to be converted into a points system. Minus 
points awarded for sanctioned behaviour 
may have direct legal consequences, such 
as fines or restrictions. 
Viewed objectively, the Chinese approach 
to integrating digital technology into the 
judicial process is also avant-garde. During 
the COVID-19 pandemic, many Chinese 
courts went online overnight. From a func-
tional point of view, it certainly makes 
sense to learn lessons from the Chinese 
judiciary’s affinity for technology – where 
the knowledge gained can be integrated 
into the democratic system. The CPC is try-
ing to provide authoritarian answers to 
questions arising from globalisation and 
to embed these endeavours in its concept 
of the rule of law. It remains to be seen, 
whether China’s vision will be attractive to 
third countries. At least when it comes to 
increasing the efficiency of state action and 
reducing arbitrariness through technology, 
it seems plausible. China is trying to achieve 
precisely this goal with its digital Silk Road. 
One can assume that Chinese negotiators, 
diplomats and entrepreneurs will soon be 
making arguments that include the phrase 
“Chinese rule of law”. In future, Beijing’s 
use of the law as an instrument to enforce 
political interests will become increasingly 
efficient as lawyers become better trained 
in its use. 
For political decision-makers in Germany 
and Europe, it is first important to take 
seriously the fact that the Chinese leader-
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ship is developing its own, fundamentally 
different “rule-of-law” concept and pro-
moting it internationally. More translation 
and contextualisation of the terms being 
used by Beijing is essential. Without a his-
torical and political classification of the 
phrases translated strategically into English 
by the CPC, such as “rule of law”, it is im-
possible to adequately understand Chinese 
behaviour and respond to it appropriately. 
It might result in false expectations and 
political costs, such as misinterpretations 
of mutual obligations. 
In addition to expertise and legal knowl-
edge about China, specific knowledge of 
socialist legal concepts is also helpful. Fur-
thermore, it is necessary to tap into the 
knowledge of Chinese legal concepts that 
exists in universities and bring it into the 
mainstream. This knowledge should be 
included in discussions about functional 
political decisions and in intergovernmen-
tal negotiations with China in a bilateral 
and multilateral framework. 
Political decision-makers in Germany 
and Europe should prepare specifically 
for Chinese argumentation patterns and 
scenarios. The following aspects are par-
ticularly affected: 
The rights of foreigners and foreign 
companies in China: there is a legal grey 
area in to which it is increasingly easy to 
fall as a foreigner, especially because China 
attaches great importance to national secu-
rity. As a result, legal certainty in China is 
suffering, as evidenced by the recent sanc-
tions against EU citizens and institutions. 
Anyone “associated” with sanctioned insti-
tutions or persons is prohibited from “doing 
business” in China. The terms “associated” 
and “doing business” are not explained in 
detail. The wording of the sanctions against 
British persons and organisations, for ex-
ample, is much clearer. At the same time, 
however, there is more legal certainty for 
foreigners and foreign companies in “non-
sensitive” areas. 
International treaties: it is essential 
to set effective incentives and to introduce 
effective control mechanisms in inter-
national agreements with China, due to 
the Chinese leadership’s understanding of 
the law as a tool. Otherwise, a contractual 
agreement such as the comprehensive agree-
ment on investment between the EU and 
China (CAI) from December 2020 is worth 
little more than the paper it’s written on. 
In such cases, the actual negotiations only 
start after the contract has been signed. 
Chinese core interests: the core inter-
ests of the PRC include Beijing’s interpre-
tation of the “one country, two systems” 
principle regarding Taiwan or Hong Kong, 
the Chinese leadership’s view of its terri-
torial integrity, for example with regard to 
the South China Sea and the border con-
flicts with India and Japan, as well as inter-
nal affairs and especially human rights 
issues regarding Tibet or Xinjiang. China 
will be better prepared to defend these 
interests based on its own understanding 
of the law. Europe can expect to encounter 
more headwinds here. Beijing is also forg-
ing strategic alliances and using United 
Nations organisations as a mouthpiece, 
such as the UN Human Rights Council. 
Extra-territorial dimension: interna-
tional law enforcement cooperation is the 
area Beijing is pushing hardest when it 
comes to international legal partnerships. 
This could have serious consequences for 
Europeans in countries that have concluded 
mutual legal assistance or law enforcement 
agreements with Beijing. They may even be 
extradited to China. 
International discourse power regard-
ing the concept of the rule of law: Beijing 
will increasingly promote its own definition 
of the rule of law internationally. For the 
CPC leadership, it is a matter of questioning 
established definitions and then countering 
them with Chinese terms. The Chinese side 
argues that the existing international legal 
system reflects the balance of power from 
the period immediately after the Second 
World War. Beijing is calling for a general 
overhaul of the world order because the 
international power structure has changed 
fundamentally. 
For German and European decision-
makers, this development means that the 
rule of law should continue to be promoted 
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in third countries, such as those in the 
Indo-Pacific region. In its policy guidelines 
for the Indo-Pacific region, the federal gov-
ernment explicitly promises to promote 
the rule of law in the region. In addition, 
the rule of law would be an important com-
ponent of an effective transatlantic China 
strategy. 
Despite difficult bilateral relations, in a 
dialogue with China on the rule of law, 
procedural issues would be an area in 
which an objective discussion still appears 
possible. One example would be digitalisa-
tion in civil proceedings. 
Glossary 
法治中国建设规划 (Fǎzhì zhōngguó jiànshè 
guīhuà) – Plan on Building the rule of law 
in China 
国特色社会主义法治 (Zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì 
fǎzhì) – Socialist rule of law with Chinese 
characteristics 
习近平法治思想 (Xíjìnpíng fǎzhì sīxiǎng) – 
Xi Jinping Thought on the rule of law 
中国特色 (Zhōngguó tèsè) – with Chinese 
characteristics 
法治 (Fǎzhì) – Rule of/by law 
法制 (Fǎzhì) – Legal system 
习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想 (Xíjìnpíng xīn 
shídài zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì sīxiǎng) – 
Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese 
characteristics for a new era 
科学立法 (Kēxué lìfǎ) – Scientific legislation 
和谐社会 (Héxié shèhuì) – Harmonious society 
智慧法治 (Zhìhuì fǎzhì) – Smart rule of law 
依法治国 (Yīfǎ zhìguó) – Law-based govern-
ance 
优秀传统法律文化 (Yōuxiù chuántǒng fǎlǜ 
wénhuà) – Excellent traditional Chinese 
legal culture 
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